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There is a perennial expert debate about the criteria to be included or excluded for the
DSM diagnoses of substance use dependence. Yet analysts routinely report evidence for
the unidimensionality of the resulting checklist. If in fact the checklist is unidimensional, the
experts are wrong that the criteria are distinct, so either the experts are mistaken or the
reported unidimensionality is spurious. I argue for the latter position, and suggest that the
traditional reflexive measurement model is inappropriate for the DSM; a formative mea-
surement model would be a more accurate characterization of the institutional process by
which the checklist is created, and a network or causal model would be a more appropriate
foundation for a scientifically grounded diagnostic system.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association (DSM) appeared in 1952, there have
been six revisions – roughly one revision every decade [DSM-
II in 1968, DSM-III in 1980, DSM-III-R in 1987, DSM-IV in
1994, DSM-IV-TR in 2000, and DSM-5 in 2013; see Ref. (1)].
These manuals provide an evolving checklist of possible indi-
cators of drug abuse and/or drug dependence, some subset of
which will trigger a distinct categorical diagnosis. Because these
diagnoses are seen as consequential for clinicians, clients, treat-
ment facilities, third-party payers, and for the development of
addiction science, the years preceding each revision always see
a lively and vigorous debate among experts about which indi-
cators of substance abuse and dependence – e.g., withdrawal,
tolerance, cravings, legal problems – do or don’t belong in the
checklist.
To an outside observer, the process can appear chaotic and
as political as it is scientific. But somehow, the resulting checklist
seems to have a noteworthy psychometric property. Using popular
psychometric methods, it has been argued that the DSM diagnos-
tic criteria for substance dependence (DSM-IV) or a substance use
disorder (DSM-5) form a unidimensional scale – implying that
they are tapping a single, coherent latent construct, either “sub-
stance abuse” (for a given substance), “substance dependence,” or
in the newest iteration, the combined construct “substance use
disorder” [e.g., (2–6)].
But there is something odd about this. If indeed the DSM cri-
teria form a unidimensional construct, then there should be little
reason to spend years debating specific items to include in the
construct. Under the measurement model that characterizes most
psychometric analyses of DSM data, these indicators should be
roughly interchangeable, in the same way that different items on
an attitude scale, vocabulary test, or personality trait inventory tap
different manifestations of the same underlying construct. And the
corollary observation is that if the criteria that get debated – with-
drawal, tolerance, craving, and the like – are indeed conceptually
and empirically distinct (as I think they almost certainly are),
then the evidence for the unidimensionality of the DSM criteria is
perhaps puzzling or even troubling, rather than reassuring.
This essay does not contend the DSM diagnostic criteria are
foolish or meaningless, or that adopting them was a serious mis-
take by some criterion of harm to patients. Rather, I argue that
(a) there is confusion about the underlying structure of the DSM
substance-related diagnostic criteria, and (b) greater clarity might
promote the development of better science, better practice, and
better inputs to management and policymaking. These are analytic
issues that deserve attention in the coming decade, in anticipation
of the eventual next iteration, DSM-6.
DSM-IV AND DSM-5 SUBSTANCE-USE CRITERIA
The DSM-IV (7) distinguished “substance abuse” from “substance
dependence,” using a checklist of seven criteria for the latter (see
Table 1). The DSM-IV was described in terms of two dimen-
sions (abuse and dependence), but my comments about it (and
its research literature) refer to the claim that the second factor,
dependence, was unidimensional. The DSM-5 (1, 8) collapses the
distinction between abuse and dependence, and calls for a “sub-
stance use disorder” diagnosis, triggered by any two or more of 11
criteria, with six or more indicating a severe case. This decision
was apparently based in part on evidence that the abuse items and
the dependence items formed a single dimension [e.g., (6)].
ALTERNATIVE PSYCHOMETRIC MODELS FOR LATENT
CONSTRUCTS
What would it mean for a list of such criteria to constitute
a unidimensional latent construct? There are several alterna-
tive psychometric measurement models that can operationalize a
latent construct. They quite literally imply different metaphysical
www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 153 | 1
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MacCoun Unidimensionality and the DSM
Table 1 | DSM-IV “substance dependence” and DSM-5 “substance use
disorder” diagnostic criteria.
Criterion DSM-IV
substance
dependence
DSM-5
substance use
disorder
Tolerance X X
Withdrawal X X
Taken more/longer than intended X X
Desire/unsuccessful efforts to quit use X X
Great deal of time taken by activities
involved in use
X X
Use despite knowledge of problems
associated with use
X X
Important activities given up because
of use
X X
Recurrent use resulting in a failure to
fulfill important role obligations
X
Recurrent use resulting in physically
hazardous behavior (e.g., driving)
X
Continued use despite recurrent social
problems associated with use
X
Craving for the substance X
assumptions – ontologically, what construct exists, and epistemo-
logically, how to do we identify it? – but also different mathematical
definitions. The discussion that follows gets slightly technical, and
requires a few simple equations, but to keep things simple I assume
there is only one latent construct (e.g., “dependence”) and that
the terms in the model have unit weights (i.e., wi= 1 so that
wiX i=Xi).
REFLECTIVE MODELS
Traditional factor-analytic models (whether exploratory or confir-
matory) are usually specified mathematically as a set of structural
equations of the form Xi= F + ei, where each X is one of i
observed or “manifest” variables (e.g., test items or diagnostic cri-
teria), and F is the underlying latent construct thought to cause
each X to take on its observed values [e.g., (9–11)]. Importantly,
the e terms reflect any idiosyncratic variance associated with the
observed variables but not caused by the underlying latent con-
struct of interest. This has an important implication; if any two
observed variables share a common latent factor, it is assumed
that these variables share nothing systematic in common other
than that factor – they are “conditionally independent” unless the
default assumption of uncorrelated error terms is explicitly over-
ridden. Any model with these features is now commonly referred
to as a“reflective model”(10). The reflective model (see Figure 1A)
is a method of constructing unidimensional composite scales and
justifying their interpretation as such.
The most common theoretical justification for this interpreta-
tion is thedomain sampling assumption that the observed variables
we retain as indicators of the latent construct are essentially inter-
changeable exemplars sampled arbitrarily from a much larger
domain of possible expressions of the construct. “The model of
domain sampling conceives of a trait as being a group of behaviors
all of which have some property in common. . . .If the sample [of
indicators] we draw from domain is representative, than its statisti-
cal characteristics are the same as those of the total domain” [(11),
p. 211–212]. Specifically, in expectation any sufficiently large ran-
dom sample of indicators from the domain should yield the same
average value, and the same correlations among indicators. This
notion of sampling is of course hypothetical, not literal, and that
creates an important conceptual twist: “Instead of specifying a
population of some set of entities and then drawing a sample ran-
domly from it, . . . we have a sample in hand that in turn implies
a population . . . having the same characteristics as the sample”
[(11), 214 p.].
Most of the published psychometric analyses of DSM criteria
that I have examined adopt the reflective model of factor analy-
sis, without explicit justification. But this creates an unacknowl-
edged conceptual puzzle: according to that model, any differences
between two criteria – say, withdrawal symptoms vs. interference
with important activities – are simply part of the error structure of
the model rather than the construct itself, or its composite score.
In other words, the distinctive features of each criteria that form
the basis for expert debates about DSM construction are actually
irrelevant to the model. Under the domain sampling assumption,
there should be relatively little to argue about; we can inductively
generate large sets of candidate criteria and simply cull out the
ones that don’t “load” on the common factor (This is basically
how intelligence tests are constructed.). I very much doubt this is
how most DSM experts view the diagnostic criterion list, yet this
is how the analyses treat it.
FORMATIVE MODELS
There is a less familiar alternative way of specifying a latent factor
model – the “formative model” [Figure 1B; see Ref. (9, 10)]. This
model is superficially similar – it consists of the same observed
indicator variables, plus one or more latent factors, and an error
term. But the assumptions are quite different. In a formative
model, the latent factor does not cause the observed variables;
rather, they cause – or more accurately, “constitute” – the latent
factor. Mathematically, the model would be represented by an
equation of the form F =ΣXi+e but F is now the dependent
variable, and there is a single error term for the factor, rather
error terms for each observed variable (X). That means that any-
thing distinctive or idiosyncratic that distinguishes two observed
variables – say, withdrawal symptoms vs. interference with impor-
tant activities – is part of the construct and its measurement.
As a result, formative models are not assumed to be “unidimen-
sional” and indeed, some heterogeneity among the criteria is seen
as desirable.
Formative models are not inductive, at least not in the sense that
a latent construct emerges from the observed variance of a reflec-
tive model. Rather, formative models are a form of “measurement
by fiat.” The analyst, or some other authority, decrees that cer-
tain observable criteria will collectively constitute what the latent
construct actually means. An example is professional accreditation
(constituted by education, degree, years of experience, a passing
exam score).
A formative model seems to better capture the way many
psychiatrists actually debate the DSM criteria, and it also better
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FIGURE 1 | Alternative theoretical models for interpreting a latent construct. (A) reflective model, (B) formative model, (C) Guttman scale, (D) causal
chain, (E) causal model, and (F) network model.
characterizes the actual decision process – organizational fiat –
that determines which criteria are included vs. excluded. But a
growing number of simulation studies show that when data actu-
ally have a formative structure, fitting them using reflective models
can lead to significantly biased and misleading estimates of model
fit and factor scores [e.g., (13)]. Whether this helps to explain the
puzzle I noted earlier – high unidimensionality despite what are
surely conceptually distinct DSM criteria – would probably require
focused re-analysis of major DSM data sets1.
A GUTTMAN SCALE?
There is, however, an alternative psychometric model that might
produce unidimensionality despite conceptually distinct mea-
sures – a Guttman scale [or a stochastic variant, the Mokken
scale; see Ref. (16)]. As suggested by Figure 1C, the variables in a
Guttman scale have a cumulative structure. An example might be
a diagnosis of AIDS; anyone who has the disease AIDS is infected
with HIV, and anyone who is infected with HIV was exposed
to HIV at some earlier date when they were still HIV-negative.
Thus if we determine that someone is HIV-positive, we can con-
clude that they were exposed to HIV, but we cannot conclude that
they have AIDS or will necessarily have AIDS in the future. Like
formative models, Guttman scales can emerge by fiat: with rare
exceptions, we decree that those with a Ph.D. must have a Bach-
elors Degree, and that those with Bachelors Degree must have
1An additional explanation for unidimensionality might be rater bias due to shared
mental prototypes of dependence among clinicians [compare Ref. (14, 15)].
completed high school. Alternatively Guttman-scaled phenomena
can emerge through a chain of causal processes (see Figure 1D)
that occur in a consistent order.
If the DSM criteria formed a clear Guttman scale, this might
provide a tidy resolution to the puzzle noted at the outset – the
fact that psychiatrists argue over the distinct features of DSM
criteria and yet claim that the DSM provides a unidimensional
diagnosis of substance use disorder. But the empirical literature
is not encouraging. I have only been able to locate two studies
that test whether the DSM substance-use criteria form a Guttman
scale. Kosten et al. (5) computed Guttman scale scores using
DSM-III-R criteria for each of seven substance classes for 83
psychiatric patients. Carroll et al. (2) followed the same proce-
dures using DSM-IV criteria for six substance classes for 521
people drawn from a variety of different clinical and general
population sources. Across four substance classes, the Guttman
reproducibility coefficients averaged 0.89 for the DSM-III-R study
and 0.80 for the DSM-IV study. Common benchmarks for this
coefficient are 0.85 or 0.90; diagnoses met the lower standard
in both studies for alcohol, cocaine, and the opiates, but not
for sedatives, stimulants, or marijuana. More troublingly, if we
limit the focus to four criteria that are roughly the same in both
version of the DSM – withdrawal, tolerance, “giving up activi-
ties,” and “use despite problems” – their relative rankings within
a given substance category are inconsistent across the two studies,
with correlations ranging from −0.57 to 0.11 (mean r =−0.20).
Granted, some differences are expected due to differences in year
and sample, but it is difficult to see anything like a coherent
www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 153 | 3
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Guttman measurement model either within or across substance
categories.
Another source of evidence comes from comparisons of the
prevalence of each criterion, by substance, in different studies. If
the criteria come close to forming a Guttman scale, then differ-
ent studies should find a similar ordering, with the prevalence of
some criteria (those near the low end of the scale) being consis-
tently higher than other criteria (those near the high end of the
scale). I compared prevalence estimates from three samples (2, 3,
4, 6). The average correlations of the criterion ranks across studies
were only 0.54, 0.32, and 0.25 for cannabis, opiates, and cocaine,
respectively.
CAUSAL MODELS AND NETWORK MODELS
One reason why items have Guttman scale properties is if they
have form a simple causal chain (Figure 1F), but the evidence
against a Guttman scale interpretation, reviewed above, also casts
doubt on any simple causal model. Figure 1E shows a causal
model that is more complex than a simple causal chain. Even
a cursory examination of the DSM substance-use criteria sug-
gests that they might have this kind of complex internal causal
structure. First, many of the criteria require the clinician or the
patient to make causal attributions: e.g., “Recurrent use resulting
in a failure to fulfill important role obligations” or “continued
use despite recurrent social problems associated with use” (italics
added for emphasis).
Second, many of the criteria are likely to have causal linkages to
each other. For example, tolerance implies that the user will seek
larger doses, which might well increase the time taken to obtain
the drug will increase. Withdrawal symptoms and craving have
long been implicated in income-generating crime, needle sharing,
prostitution, and other forms of physically hazardous and socially
dysfunctional behavior [e.g., (17–19)].
Third, in addition to any psychopharmacological mechanisms,
most of the criteria are causally influenced by the social, cultural,
economic, and legal context in which substance use takes place
[see Ref. (20)]. A striking illustration comes from clinical trials for
heroin maintenance in Europe (21); when registered addicts are
allowed easy access to high-quality heroin, their criminality drops,
their health improves, and they are increasingly like to hold a job.
But most clients do not quit using; on the contrary, many signif-
icantly increase their daily dose, so the intervention reduces their
disorder on some criteria while possibly increasing their disorder
by other criteria.
Figure 1F, reproduced from Cramer et al. (12), illustrates the
kind of elaborate causal network that Borsboom, Kendler, and
their colleagues have recently proposed as a more realistic model
for many traits. In their framework, latent constructs neither cause
observed manifestations (as in a reflective model) nor does an
explicit subset of observed variables constitute the latent con-
struct (as in a formative model). Rather, the latent construct
is an emergent property of the entire network. An implication
of the causal structure in Figures 1E,F is even when simple 1-
factor models fit the data, the fit may be spurious in that the
model assumed by the equations may be very different than the
model that validly describes the processes that generated the data.
Moreover, combining them in an “any two of the following”
recipe will obscure the valuable information contained in that
causal structure.
DISCUSSION
Judging from past experience, we might expect the next DSM
(DSM-6) to surface in about a decade. So in the spirit of con-
stant improvement, I respectfully urge DSM developers to consider
pursuing, in parallel, at least three kinds of alternative DSM candi-
dates: a pure reflective model, a pure formative model, and a pure
causal network model. One of the three may emerge as superior.
But diagnostic systems attempt to serve multiple goals, and it may
be advantageous to use different systems for different purposes.
These arguments for greater theoretical and psychometric
coherence might seem to have a sort of ivory-tower fastidious-
ness, if not outright neuroticism. After all, the perfect is surely the
enemy of the good, and the DSM does a good job much of the
time, at least as judged by the utility that clinicians and managed
care organizations seem to find in it.
But I think there are good practical reasons for improving the
coherence of the DSM substance use. One is that it might provide
a better linkage to drug policy. A decade ago, I argued that contem-
porary thinking about addiction was surprisingly inconsequential
for major public policy debates about drug use, or for empirical
drug policy analysis (22). The DSM-5 probably helps to close that
gap, as it emphasizes the harmful consequences that citizens care
about. On the other hand, the gap between the DSM and drug sci-
ence may be growing rather than shrinking. For example, a recent
review of seven major scientific theories of drug addiction (23)
examines whether each theory can account for various “addic-
tive phenomena.” Of the seven theories, four offer an account of
withdrawal and three an account of tolerance – two explicit DSM
criteria. Six offer accounts of relapse, and four an account of bing-
ing – two phenomena that aren’t directly mentioned in the DSM
but are closely related to other DSM criteria. But all seven offer
accounts of craving, a criterion that only recently entered the DSM
checklist. And four address “sensitization” – which is increasingly
recognized as a signature feature of the etiology of addiction but
receives no mention in the DSM.
Kosten et al. (5) attribute the unidimensional aspiration behind
the DSM to a published WHO memorandum by Edwards (24).
Three decades later, that memorandum is still a remarkably
insightful analysis. But my reading of it is different than of Kosten
et al. While Edwards et al. did argue for a dimensional account
of dependence, they explicitly rejected the notion that it should
be unidimensional. Edwards et al. [(24), 233 p.] argue that “what
the present model would seem to propose is that a clinical or an
operational definition of dependence must be multidimensional
and, in terms of measurements, related to a number of phenom-
ena within the syndrome.”And the picture they offered very much
seems to anticipate the kind of causal network model that Cramer
et al. (9, 12) are developing:
We believe that a system or syndrome model that seeks to
take into account of the interaction between drug, person,
and environment, is much to be preferred. Any interpreta-
tion that places too much emphasis on only one part of the
whole system is imperfect and misleading.” [(24), 232 p.].
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This essay does not even begin to sketch out what a superior diag-
nostic system might look like; I don’t even pretend to know. But
I am not calling for the abandonment of the DSM-5, or even a
change in the list of indicators currently in use. Rather, I am sug-
gesting that we need a better understanding of what the patterns
of covariance in DSM data actually mean. If tolerance and with-
drawal and craving and psychosocial dysfunction and the other
DSM criteria are distinct concepts – and I think they clearly are –
why should we expect them to form a single dimension? A system
that took seriously their conceptual distinctiveness would facili-
tate a better understanding of the causal structure that may well
link them together. And a system that articulated that causal struc-
ture might improve our ability to protect high-risk clients before
their problems become severe, and to more closely link treatment
decisions to theory and measurement.
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